Cognitive

Part 7 · Agentic AI Security

ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse

Delegation chains and inherited credentials can give an agent more authority than the person it serves.

3 min readBuilds on ASI02: Tool Misuse and Exploitation

OWASP ASI03. This material is for defense. Only test systems you own or are authorized to test.

Privileges can accumulate as work is delegated between agents.

What it is

Identity and privilege abuse exploits dynamic trust and delegation between agents. Attackers manipulate delegation chains, role inheritance, control flows, or agent context to escalate access or bypass controls.

Agents often lack a distinct, governed identity, so traditional access systems struggle to tell who is really acting.

How the attack unfolds

This is the confused deputy problem: a trusted intermediary uses its authority for someone who lacks it.

Figure 42.1. This is the confused deputy problem: a trusted intermediary uses its authority for someone who lacks it.

Common patterns

  • Inherited privileges passed down a delegation chain.
  • Credentials cached in memory or conversation history.
  • Confused deputy requests between trusted agents.
  • Stale permissions that remain after the task changes.
  • Spoofed agent identity in multi-agent systems.

Defenses

Short-lived, task-scoped access limits delegation abuse.
  1. Issue task-scoped credentials. Keep them short-lived and narrow.
  2. Give each agent its own identity. Avoid shared service accounts.
  3. Preserve the user's identity. Carry it through every delegation.
  4. Isolate sessions. Clear context and credentials between tasks.
  5. Authorize every step. Re-check permission at each privileged action.
  6. Audit delegation. Record who authorized what, and through which agent.

Common misconception

Common belief

"The agent is authenticated, so its request is authorized."

In practice

Authentication proves who the agent is. It does not prove that the person behind the request has permission.

Key takeaways

  • Delegation can pass along more authority than intended.
  • Credentials should be short-lived and scoped to a task.
  • Authorization must consider the original user.